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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 960831-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
TONY R. MAESTAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting,
or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance (cocaine), within 1000
feet of a public school, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991), and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), in the Third
Judicial District Court, Michael R. Murphy presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Ineffective assistance. Where a confidential informant's testimony was
corroborated by other witnesses, and drugs and money were found on defendant's person,

did defense counsel prejudice the trial outcome by not impeaching the confidential informant
with his prior criminal record and early parole?
M

[W]here the trial court has held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings

relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [this Court will] defer to the trial
court's findings of fact." State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah App. 1996) (citing
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App.1995)). It will Mthen apply the appropriate
legal principles to the facts and decide, for the first time on appeal, whether the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment/1 Id.
However, "appellate review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential;
otherwise the 'distorting effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for
courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record."
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
2. Suppression of evidence. Should drugs found on defendant have been suppressed
on the ground that the search was incident to an arrest effected by corrections officers
acting outside the scope of their statutory authority?
Defendant asserts both trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Where,
as here, a defendant did not timely assert his challenge to a search, he must on appeal
demonstrate "plain error, meaning that error was obvious and substantially prejudicial."
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 56 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
2

1224 (Utah 1993)). See issue 1, above, for the standard of review applicable to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
3. Probation revocation. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that
defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation?
"The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial
court." State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)). "Thus, in order to prevail in this case, defendant 'must
show that the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking
defendant's probation.'" Id. "Moreover, a trial court's finding of a probation violation
is a factual one and therefore must be given deference on appeal unless the finding is
clearly erroneous." Id. (citing State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991)).
In making this determination, the appellate court will view the evidence "in a light most
favorable to the trial court'sfindings."Martinez, 811 P.2d at 208 (quoting State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 790, 804 (Utah 1990) (emphasis omitted)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following provisions is reproduced in addendum A:
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 64-13-1 (Supp. 1991);
§ 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991);
§ 64-13-8 (Supp. 1991);
§ 64-13-10 (Supp. 1991).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Original prosecution
Defendant was charged by Information dated 25 March 1992 as follows:
Count I

Distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting, or arranging to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance (cocaine), within 1000 feet of
a public school, afirstdegree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991);

Count II

Possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991)

(R. 6-7). The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 36). A jury found
defendant guilty on both counts (R. 69-70, 73-74).
The court sua sponte committed defendant to the Utah State Prison for a 90-day
diagnostic evaluation (R. 81, 84-85). It later ordered defendant released from the Utah
State Prison and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail for purposes of an evaluation
by Odyssey House (R. 98). The court instructed defense counsel that, if defendant did
not meet the acceptance criteria for Odyssey House's treatment program, he should find
an alternative treatment program (R. 98).
After numerous continuances, defendant was sentenced on 27 December 1993 to
statutory prison terms and fines (R. 99-106). However, the prison terms were stayed
and defendant placed on 36-month probation on stated conditions (R. 104-06). Defendant
filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed for defendant's failure to file an
appellant's brief (R. 76, 109).
4

Probation revocation
On 24 June 1994, Adult Probation and Parole filed a "Progress/Violation Report"
charging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation (R. 110, addendum
C). The court issued an Order to Show Cause and held an evidentiary hearing (R 11711721, 125, 129, 131-32). The court revoked defendant's probation and committed him
to the Utah State Prison (R. 131, 143-48, 152-54).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 150). This appeal was dismissed 17 January 1995
on defendant's motion for voluntary dismissal (R. 156 [unnumbered page]).
Johnson resentencing
On 7 April 1995, represented by new counsel, defendant filed a Verified Rule 65B
Petition for Relief from Conviction and Extraordinary Writ alleging trial errors and also
complaining of conditions of his confinement (HC: 1-5).1 On 17 June 1996, at the
suggestion of the State, the court resentenced defendant nunc pro tunc to statutory prison
terms (R. 174-77, 663).2 See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). Defendant
timely appealed (R. 178). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to the Utah
Court of Appeals (R. 207).

1

The proceeding under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was a new matter
assigned Civil No. 950902479 HC. This brief will refer to record pages in this civil case
thus: "(HC: l)."
2

Since the petition did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel {see HC: 1-5), it is
unclear—but irrelevant to this appeal—on what basis the court resentenced defendant.
5

Rule 23B hearing
This Court remanded the case to the district court pursuant to rule 23 B, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, for "entry of findings of fact regarding appellant's claim of
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel" (R. 770). The district court held an evidentiary
hearing and entered findings of fact (R. 779, 784-790).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FactsfromtriaP
Leo Lucey is a certified peace officer in the State of Utah and an investigator for
the Department of Corrections (DOC) (R. 383-84). Lucey recruited Teresa Gabaldon,
an AP&P probation officer, to work on a special project to apprehend persons supplying
drugs to inmates of the Utah State Prison (R. 355, 368, 374-75, 384-85). Lucey had
been informed that inmate Tony Waldron had knowledge of this prison drug trade (R.
385). He asked Waldron if he would act as a confidential informant, and Waldron agreed
(R. 374, 382, 385). He was promised "a letter" if he helped out (R. 379).
Eight to ten officers were involved (R. 385). They targeted approximately four
to five potential suppliers whom Waldron would attempt to contact (R. 385).
On 14 March 1992, Gabaldon drove inmate Waldron to the Salt Lake homes of
two drug dealers to effect controlled buys (R. 355-58). Waldron wore a "wire" (R. 360).

3

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993).
6

The dealers were Patricia Chacon and Jeanette Appleman (R. 356). At Appleman's
apartment, Gabaldon and Waldron talked about buying drugs with Chacon and Appleman,
who paged their supplier (R. 358-59).4 By early afternoon the supplier had not arrived,
so Appleman, accompanied by Gabaldon, walked to a 7-Eleven to place another page
(R. 359-62).
While waiting for the page to be returned, Appleman talked to Gabaldon about
other possible suppliers (R. 362). Appleman said that her neighbor had a brother named
Tony Maestas (defendant) who could get drugs for her, but that she had no way of reaching
him (R. 362). However, she added, he often dropped by her apartment and that he might
drop by and they could buy cocaine from him (R. 363). After waiting for the original
supplier to return the page, they gave up and went back to the apartment in case defendant
stopped by (R. 363).
In the meantime, Waldron, who had remained behind at the apartment house, entered
Appleman's apartment, where he met defendant and another man (R. 375-76). Waldron
told the men that Jeanette was out making a phone call trying to get some cocaine (R.
376). Defendant then pulled out a little bag and said, "I have this right here" (R. 376).
It was cocaine (R. 431-32). Defendant asked Waldron if he was a cop, and Waldron
said no, but was on a "home visit" (from prison) (R. 376-77, 403). The other man then
left the apartment (R. 377). Waldron purchased some cocaine from defendant for $100
4

This apartment was within 1000 feet of a school (R. 392-93).
7

and defendant left (R. 377). From a surveillance van, DOC Officer Kim Allen observed
the men enter and leave Appleman's apartment (R. 402-04). He and Officer Lucey also
monitored the entire conversation over Waldron's body wire (R. 388, 403-06).
When the women returned from the 7-Eleven, Appleman said to Gabaldon, "Well,
there they are now . . . I know I can get some stuff from them" (R. 363). Appleman
walked over, talked to defendant and his companion, returned to Gabaldon's car, pointed
to defendant, and said, "Well, he already sold him [Waldron] cocaine" (R. 363). Gabaldon
parked the car and waited for Waldron to come out of the apartment (R. 363).
Waldron came out of the apartment, got into Gabaldon's car, gave her the cocaine
that he had purchased from defendant, and they notified other agents that the drug buy
was complete and identified defendant and his companion as the sellers (R. 364, 377).
Those agents, armed peace officers, stopped the car in which defendant was a
passenger (R. 409, 412, 422). Officer Sundquist searched defendant and found a folded
dollar bill containing cocaine and a wallet with $385.25 (R. 419, 432).
Defendant gave his version of events at trial, admitting he was in the apartment
with Waldron, but denied selling him cocaine. He claimed that he asked to use the bathroom
in Appleman's apartment and when he went in, "I found one hundred bucks. Of course
I'm going to pick it up if it's lying there, so I picked up the money" (R. 438). In fact,
he maintained that he the right to take the money: "I thought it was mine, yes. I found
it" (R. 451). He justified his actions thus: "It's money. Money. It's money" (R. 452).
8

He testified that he told Waldron, "How much do you need? If you give me the
money I could probably get it [the cocaine]," but that he intended to steal the money
(R. 447). He also claimed that as he was leaving the apartment Waldron handed him
a dollar bill—"it was like a handshake"—and he just looked at it and said, "Right on"
and put it in his pocket without thinking about it (R. 439, 442). Defendant testified that
he knew the bill contained drugs, but took it because "it was for free" (R. 444).
Facts from the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress
Teresa Gabaldon, a DOC officer acting undercover, accompanied a confidential
informant, Tony Waldron, on an undercover drug operation in Salt Lake City (R. 232-33).
Waldron was wearing a body wire (R. 237, 242). Officer Leo Lucey, a DOC investigator,
monitored all of Waldron's conversations from a surveillance van (R. 241-42). Officer
Ken Allen, a supervisor for Adult Probation and Parole, both monitored the wire and
watched the events through a telescope (R. 258, 258-59).
Waldron asked Jeanette Appleman and Patricia Chacon to line him up with someone
to sell him some cocaine (R. 233). Gabaldon accompanied Appleman to a 7-Eleven,
where the latter paged her supplier (R. 234). This attempt to locate a supplier "had nothing
to do with Maestas" (R. 239). However, while waiting for the supplier to return the page,
Appleman mentioned that defendant "sold cocaine, and she'd be able to get some from
him if she could locate him, but that he did not have a telephone or a pager" (R. 234).
She said he often stopped by her apartment (R. 234).
9

While Appleman and Gabaldon were gone to the 7-Eleven, the sale had taken place
as follows. Two Hispanic males (one later identified as defendant) got out of a car and
approached Jeanette Appleman's apartment, where Waldron was (R. 244, 259, 264-66).
Over the wire, Officers Lucey and Allen heard a knock at the door (R. 244, 259). Officer
Allen heard a conversation between the two men and Waldron (R. 259). Thereafter,
one of the two Hispanic men returned to the parking lot, leaving defendant and Waldron
as the only males in the apartment (R. 257, 259-60). Lucey heard defendant ask Waldron
what kind of drugs he wanted; shortly thereafter Waldron notified Lucey that the transaction
had been completed (R. 244).
When Appleman and Gabaldon returned to the apartment house, defendant was
in the parking lot (R. 235). He told Appleman he had already sold Waldron some cocaine
(R 235, 238). Waldron got into the car with Gabaldon and gave her the drugs (R 235-36).
Defendant and the other Hispanic man drove away, followed by police (R. 270).
They were stopped and searched (R. 271). A bindle containing cocaine and $384 in
cash were found on defendant (R. 271).
Waldron was searched before and after the transaction and had no drugs (R. 240,
248). At the time of the transaction, Waldron had "been guaranteed nothing but a
recommendation to the Board of Pardons" (R. 254).
Waldron did not testify in this hearing (see R. 228).

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Ineffective assistance. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient
for not discovering information usable to impeach Waldron, defendant suffered no prejudice.
Waldron's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses in every material respect.
Officer Allen viewed the entire transaction from outside the apartment house. He and
Officer Lucey monitored the entire drug transaction over the body wire Waldron was
wearing. And defendant himself told Appleman that he had sold Waldron some cocaine.
Finally, defendant had cocaine and money on him when he was arrested.
In view of this incriminating evidence, defense counsel's failure to discover and
disclose Waldron's forgery record, prison drug use, and early release and re-incarceration
before trial are not sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.
2. Suppression. Because this claim is unpreserved, defendant may prevail only
upon a showing of plain error or ineffective assistance. Neither appears here.
The agents who arrested defendant did not act in clear derogation of the statutory
limits of their authority. The statute upon which defendant relies does not clearly limit
DOC authority, but merely contains an illustrative list of some of DOC's "primary"
purposes. Furthermore, defendant thrust himself into the middle of the sting and offered
to sell drugs, an offer that peace officers were not required to ignore. Additionally,
defendant was on notice that the drugs he was selling could end up in the prison.

11

Even if the agents exceeded their statutory authority, defendant is not entitled to
suppression. Under Fourth Amendment law, the validity of an arrest is measured against
constitutional law, not statute criminal rules. Since defendant does not claim the arrest
was without probable cause, it supports a constitutional search. Nor is defendant entitled
to suppression under state law, since the violation was neither prejudicial nor in bad faith.
Because any violation was neither obvious nor prejudicial, defendant cannot establish
either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Parole revocation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding,
the evidence supports the court's finding that defendant wilfully violated parole.
Tracy Anderson, clinical director of Odyssey House, testified that defendant had
the ability to comply with the rules of the program, which prohibited suicide attempts
or ideation. Anderson even warned defendant that if he continued that behavior that
he would not be able to stay there, a warning which made sense only if defendant had
the ability to comply with the rules of the program.
Clinician Nieto opined in effect that defendant's misconduct was originally
manipulative, but that this manipulative behavior worked defendant into such a frenzy
that his further misconduct was caused more by thatfrenzythan by any intent to manipulate.
In contrast, no one testified that defendant was unable to comply with the rules,
that he was unable to control his rage when he saw his ex-wife's house during an Odyssey
House picnic, or that his threat to assault her resulted from problems beyond his control.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S TESTIMONY WAS
CORROBORATED BY OTHER WITNESSES, AND DRUGS AND
MONEY WERE FOUND ON DEFENDANT'S PERSON, DEFENSE
COUNSEL DID NOT PREJUDICE THE TRIAL OUTCOME BY NOT
IMPEACHING THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WITH HIS PRIOR
CRIMINAL RECORD AND EARLY PAROLE
Defendant claims that his "trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to present evidence at trial directly impacting on the credibility of the state's
key witness, Tony Waldron." Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant points to evidence of "Waldron's
crimes of dishonesty and the favorable treatment he received shortly after his involvement
in securing Maestas' arrest in this matter." Id.
Rule 23B hearing. The following facts were found by the trial court on remand
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.5 According to Department
of Corrections records, available pursuant to the Government Records Access and
Management Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-101 et. seq. (1993), Tony Waldron was
convicted on eleven counts of forgery, aggravated assault by a prisoner, felony fleeing,
possession of a forged writing, andfraud(R. 786-87). Corrections described him in 1987
as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all" (R. 787). In 1990, AP&P concluded that

5

No transcript of this hearing was possible because of a malfunction in the videotaping
process (R. 808). Accordingly, the State relies on the findings of fact entered by the trial
court, annexed as addendum B.
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"it would not be wise to allow [Waldron] to participate" in an undercover narcotics
investigation because of his history of drug dependency and attempted escape (R. 787).
Waldron was suspected of smuggling drugs at the prison dairy into D block, and admitted
injecting steroids at the dairy (R. 785). In the late 1980's he was disciplined twice for
a positive urinalysis and three times for possession of a controlled substance (R. 788).
On 14 March 1992, Waldron participated in the undercover operation that resulted
in defendant's arrest and conviction (R- 786). On 2 April 1992, a Special Attention Hearing
was held by the Board of Pardons; although Waldron's scheduled parole date was 14
January 1993, he was paroled that day (R. 785-86).
Nevertheless, according to Leo Lucey, the Corrections investigator who recruited
Waldron, "the only compensation Waldron received fo[r] his role as a confidential informant
was a letter of recommendation to the Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole
date as a result of a dirty urine test" (R 787). Lucey also stated that f,[t]here were absolutely
no promises or guarantees made to Mr. Waldron as to what the Board of Pardons and
Paroles [sic] would do with this recommendation" (Defendant's ex. 6).
The trial court found that Victor Gordon had represented defendant at trial (R.
784). It made no finding concerning Gordon's knowledge of, or attempts to obtain, the
foregoing information.6 Nor did it make any findings on admissibility or prejudice.
6

Defendant speculates that Gordon "likely failed to introduce the evidence because he
was unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to investigate the matter"
Br. Aplt. at 13; see also id. at 11, 17, 21.
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A.

Since Waldron's testimony was abundantly corroborated, trial
counsel's failure to fully impeach him was not prejudicial.

Controlling legal principles. ,f[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel has the difficult burden of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual
prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993) (emphasis omitted); see
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685
(Utah 1997), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 89 (1998). When reviewing counsel's performance,
"a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 685 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In order to meet the prejudice requirement, defendant must show that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair and reliable trial. Id. at 685; State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This in turn requires a showing that "there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d
at 187. A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Id. "[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must
be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which . . . will often be so, that course should be followed." Strickland, 466
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U.S. at 697. Thus, unless a defendant "has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his
trial counsel's performance, [the court] need not decide whether that performance was
deficient." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Accord State v. Huggins,
920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996).
Trial counsel's failure to discover a key witness's criminal record may draw into
question his "industry and acumen" and yet not undermine confidence in the verdict.
Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986).
This case. Disposing of the ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of prejudice
is the easier course here. Even assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient
for not discovering information usable to impeach Waldron, defendant suffered no prejudice.
Waldron was not, as defendant asserts, "the only witness to directly link Maestas
to the drug transaction." Br. Aplt. at 23. In fact, the entire story of the crime was told
in detail at the suppression hearing without Waldron's testifying (R. 228-78; summarized
at pp. 9-10 herein).
Waldron's trial testimony was heavily corroborated. Officer Allen saw defendant
enter the apartment, followed by two Mexicans (R. 402-03). He also observed one of
the Mexicans—the one who was not defendant—leave the apartment before the drug deal
occurred (R. 404-05). Officers Allen and Lucey then monitored the entire drug transaction
over the body wire Waldron was wearing (R. 388, 403-06). Shortly afterward, Appleman,
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after talking to defendant and his companion, informed Gabaldon that defendant had
sold Waldron some cocaine (R. 363).
Finally, when police stopped defendant and his companion, Officer Sundquist searched
defendant and found a folded dollar bill containing cocaine and a wallet with $385.25
(R. 419, 432).
At trial, defendant told an incredible story. He tried to explain away the $100 he
had received from Waldron by claiming that he happened to find it in the apartment (R.
438). He justified this theft by saying, "It's money. Money. It's money" (R. 452).
As for the bindle of cocaine found on him in the search, defendant claimed that Waldron
had given it to him as he was leaving the apartment—"it was like a handshake"—and
that he knew it was dope, but it took it because "it was for free" (R. 442-44).
In sum, two officers overheard the drug transaction at a time when only defendant
and Waldron were in the apartment, defendant later told Appleman that he had sold cocaine
to Waldron, and defendant was found with money and cocaine on him when he was stopped
immediately after the sale.
In view of the overwhelming weight of incriminating evidence, defense counsel's
failure to discover and disclose Waldron's forgery record, prison drug use, and early
release and re-incarceration before trial are not "sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. This is especially
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true where the most significant factor affecting his credibility—the letter of recommendation
he was promised in exchange for his trial testimony—was disclosed at trial {see R. 379).
Defendant has failed to establish prejudice, and thus his trial counsel's ineffectiveness,
as a "demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877.
B.

Any implication in defendant's brief that the prosecutor deliberately
deceived the court is baseless.

Without asserting a due process violation as such, defendant intimates that the
prosecutor deliberately deceived the jury by presenting known false evidence at trial.
See Br. Aplt. at 19-20. He cites Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979); and United
States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1976).
Obviously, the State is not free to present "false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State,." or to permit such evidence "to go uncorrected when it
appears." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70.
In Napue, the prosecutor promised a key witness that if he would testify against
Napue, a recommendation for reduction in his sentence would be "made, and, if possible,
effectuated." Id. at 266 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). At trial, the
prosecutor asked the witness, "Have I promised you that I would recommend any reduction
of sentence to anybody?" The witness answered, "You did not." Id. at 267 n.2. After
Napue was convicted, the prosecutor left government employment and filed an extraordinary
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writ on behalf of the witness seeking to enforce the terms of the agreement he had earlier
negotiated as a prosecutor. Id. at 266. The Supreme Court held that because "the false
testimony used by the State . . . may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial,"
due process required reversal of Napue's conviction. Id. at 272. See also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150(1972).
Nothing similar occurred here. At the beginning of Waldron's testimony the trial
prosecutor asked him whether he was currently an inmate at the Utah State Prison and
whether he had been an inmate on 14 March 1992 (the date of the crime); Waldron answered
affirmatively to both questions (R. 374). Nothing in the record contradicts this testimony.
The prosecutor asked nothing about any consideration offered to Waldron for testifying
(R. 374-78).
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked why Waldron would involve himself
in this "risky kind of project"; Waldron responded that "Mr. Leo said he'd write me a
good recommendation to the Board" (R. 379). He added, "I was promised a letter. That
was it" (R. 379). On cross-examination, Lucey was asked, "What was offered [Waldron]
to engage in the activity that was discussed?" Lucey answered, "At that time he'd been
guaranteed nothing but a recommendation to the Board of Pardons" (R. 254). Officer
Lucey later stated that "the only compensation Waldron received fo[r] his role as a
confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the Board of Pardons that Waldron
not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test" (R. 787). Lucey also stated that
19
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[t]here were absolutely no promises or guarantees made to Mr. Waldron as to what the

Board of Pardons and Paroles [sic] would do with this recommendation (Defendant's
ex. 6). Again, nothing in the record contradicts Waldron's or Lucey's testimony.
Defendant notes that, approximately two weeks after his arrest, and over ten months
prior to Waldron's scheduled parole date, Waldron was paroled (R. 785-86). While the
prosecutor did not elicit these facts at trial, neither did he contradict them.
Moreover, no evidence suggests that Waldron knew or believed that he would be
rewarded with early release for participating in the operation. A bargain of which the
witness is unaware cannot affect his testimony. See Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247,
249-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (no error in not disclosing to jury prosecutor's agreement with
witness's counsel to seek sentence reduction, where witness had no knowledge of deal).
Hence, the record provides little reason to believe that Waldron's testimony or conduct
was affected by the release. Moreover, the fact that Waldron was incarcerated at the
time of trial (R. 374) means that Waldron had already received, and squandered, whatever
benefit he had received from the Board.
Finally, defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, holding that
a prosecutor has a duty to impeach his own witness with facts within his knowledge if
defense counsel does not do so. Any implication of prosecutorial misconduct here is
thus unfounded.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY NOT SUA SPONTE
SUPPRESSING DRUGS DISCOVERED ON DEFENDANT INCIDENT
TO AN ARREST CONDUCTED BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, ON
THE THEORY THAT THE OFFICERS LACKED STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO ARREST A DRUG DEALER NOT SUPPLYING
DRUGS TO PRISON INMATES
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the drugs and money found
on his person on the ground that the search was incident to a legal arrest and thus
constitutional (R. 285).
Defendant attacks this ruling on the ground that the arrest was illegal. The DOC
officers who arrested him "were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah
law," he argues, because "[n]othing in the record supports that Maestas was an intended
target of the operation." Br. Aplt. at 34-35. The targets were "persons outside the
correctional facility who were suspected of supplying drugs to inmates." Id.
Defendant cites both state and federal constitutions, but does not seek "a distinct
analysis under Art. I, § 14 [of the Utah Constitution]." Br. Aplt. at 33 n.2. Accordingly,
no separate state constitutional claim is before this Court. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,
1376 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n. 5 (Utah 1988), habeas
corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.1991).
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A.

This claim was not preserved.

This claim was not preserved at trial. Defendant claims that ff[t]he defense in this
case raised the issue of the legality of the arrest in the trial court prior to re-sentencing.
(Case No. 950902479 at 160-62.)." Br. Aplt. at 45. The "trial court" defendant refers
to was the post-conviction court hearing his petition for post-conviction relief: the complete
case number in that case included a "habeas corpus" designation: 950902479 HC (see
HC: 160-62).
Defendant thus raised this issue for the first time in his 1995 postconviction
proceeding, some three years after the court's ruling. A motion to suppress evidence
must be raised at least five days before trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). His assertion
of the claim of error was thus untimely. "A party who fails to make a clear and timely
objection waives the right to raise the issue at the appellate level." State v. Matsamas,
808 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah 1991) (referring to Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)). The claim
is therefore waived.
The post-conviction court did permit defendant tofilea Motion for Arrest of Judgment
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (HC: 160-62), and it stated that "if the motions
are denied, they'll be preserved" (R. 690). However, the post-conviction court later
informed defendant, "the options are: you're re-sentenced and you go to the Court of
Appeals and lay out your issues, or you deal with it on the habeas side" (R. 736). In
other words, the post-conviction court was willing to address defendant's claims in the
22

habeas context, but not if he defendant preferred to be re-sentenced for the purpose of
bring an appeal, as he eventually did.
Defendant claims that the post-conviction court committed error in failing to address
this issue. Br. Aplt. at 45. On the contrary, it lacked authority to do so: "Once a trial
court on habeas review determines that a defendant has been denied the constitutional
right to appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately, without adjudication
of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Gordon, 913
P.2d 350, 357 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993),
overruling State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah App. 1992)). Considering claims
other than the denial of the right to appeal ffviolate[s] the principle that a habeas proceeding
is not a substitute for an appeal." Hallett, 856 P.2d at 1062. Because the post-conviction
court here re-sentenced defendant for purposes of appeal, it lacked authority to adjudicate
any other claims.
Defendant acknowledges that this Court may determine that the issue was not
preserved, and so appropriately argues the claim under ineffective assistance and plain
error. See Br. Aplt. at 45.
B.

The corrections officers acted within the scope of their statutory
authority in arresting defendant

Factual background. Officer Lucey testified at the suppression hearing that the
original targets of the investigation were persons "involved within [the Utah State Prison]

23

who'd been using this informant to mule narcotics into the facility . . . and their agents
on the street'1 (R. 255-56). The plan was for Waldron to attempt to contact approximately
four to five potential suppliers (R. 385).7
On the day in question, Waldron (the confidential informant) and Gabaldon (the
undercover agent) told Jeanette Appleman and Patricia Chacon that they were in the market
for drugs and sought their assistance in locating suppliers (R. 233). Appleman attempted
to locate a supplier by walking to a pay phone and placing several calls that "had nothing
to do with [defendant]" (R. 239). However, while waiting for the supplier to return the
page, Appleman mentioned to Gabaldon that defendant "sold cocaine, and she'd be able
to get some from him if she could locate him11 (R. 234).
7

In challenging the trial court's pretrial denial of his motion to suppress, defendant cites
to both the suppression hearing and the trial. See, e.g., Br. Aplt. at 34.
Although Utah has no explicit rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of
a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the
suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir.
\992);Baezv. State, 425 S.E.2d885, 890(Ga. App. 1992); State v. Ryder, 315N.W.2d786,
788-89 (Iowa 19*2); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229,1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651
A.2d854(Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013,1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne
R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.1(c) (1996).
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018,
1021-22 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d
1236, 1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir.
1987); State v. Young, 576So.2d 1048,1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct App. \99\); State v. Duncan,
879 S.W.2d 749,751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686,688 (Hawaii
Ct.App. 1994) (reversal).
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but not
reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the trial court at the time it ruled.
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Meanwhile, defendant had already shown up on his own with cocaine to sell and
independently sold some to Waldron (R. 235, 238). Although defendant and Waldron
apparently did not discuss whether the drugs would end up in the prison, defendant knew
that Waldron was only out on a "home visit" (R. 267, 376-77). In fact, Waldron told
defendant that he knew people in prison that defendant also knew (R. 452).
In short, defendant, sniffing a quick sale, stepped unbidden into a snare set for
others.
Analysis. Under 1991 Utah law,8 Department of Corrections (DOC) was required
to "provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, correctional
facilities, community correctional centers, and other programs or facilities as necessary
and as required to accomplish its purposes." UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-10 (Supp. 1991).
Some of the activities included in the DOC's primary purposes were listed in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991):
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include:
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement,
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate;
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders;
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders;
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and interests
of victims, where reasonable; and
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons.
8

All code citations are to the versions in effect on the date of defendant's arrest. Many
of the code sections have been substantially amended since that time. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. §64-13-6 (1996).
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(Emphasis added). Defendant paraphrases the prefatory language in this statute as follows:
"Section 64-13-6 recognized that the 'primary purposes' of the DOC were . . . " Br. Aplt.
at 35 (emphasis added). However, were and include are not equivalent terms here: were
implies the list is exhaustive; include makes clear that it is merely illustrative. See, e.g.,
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983) (the word "including" preceding a list
"indicates that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive") (quoting State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d
1172, 1175 (Utah 1982)). The list is thus illustrative, not exhaustive.
In addition, the section's reference to DOC's "primary" purposes implies the existence
of unspecified secondary purposes. Among these secondary purposes is the preparation
of presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports, a function performed by
DOC, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-20 (Supp. 1991), but not mentioned in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991).
As for the authority of the agents in question here, UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-8
(Supp. 1991) provides, "The department shall designate by policy which of its employees
have the authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and other
powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility
to bear firearms" (emphasis added).9
9

A "peace officer" was defined as "any employee of a police or law enforcement agency
which is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose
duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of
criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-la-1(a) (Supp. 1991). The authority of peace officers employed by the DOC "is
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Thus, the duties of DOC were not "specifically limited" by these sections, as defendant
contends. See Br. Aplt. at 36. Rather, the statutes give examples of DOC's "primary"
purposes, leave other primary purposes and most secondary purposes unspecified, and
authorize DOC to bestow upon its employees the authority and powers of peace officers
and "other powers the department considers appropriate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-8
(Supp. 1991). Thus, unlike the statute circumscribing a peace officer's territorial authority
at issue in State v. Fixel 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987), UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp.
1991) was not "meant to encompass the total spectrum of a police officer's acts and
authority." Fixel 744 P.2d at 1368.
It is thus far from clear that DOC officers were not authorized "to conduct criminal
investigations or operations outside correctional facilities," as defendant asserts. Br.
Aplt. at 37. Managing the care and incarceration of offenders entails excluding contraband
from the prison. If the contraband is flowing in from known outside sources, it follows
that a "secondary" function of DOC officers invested with the powers of peace officers
might well be to interdict that flow.
Defendant also argues that "at the time that correctional officers diverted from
their intended operation, they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah
law." Br. Aplt at 35. This argument suggests that even if the DOC agents were authorized

regulated by title 64, Chapter 13, Department of Corrections - State Prison." UTAH CODE
ANN. §77-1 a-1 (Supp. 1991).
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to conduct a sting of dealers known to be supplying drugs to the prison, they exceeded
their authority when they turned their focus to defendant.
First, defendant at least arguably fit the profile of the suppliers the agents were
targeting. When he sold the cocaine to Waldron he was on notice that Waldron was
a prisoner out on home release (see R. 376-77). It was therefore at least reasonably
foreseeable that a portion of the cocaine would find its way into the prison.
Second, the agents did not divert their focus; defendant stepped into it. They went
to the apartment of a person known to be connected with dealers supplying drugs to the
prison and indicated they were in the market for drugs. For obvious reasons, they did
not state that they were willing to buy drugs only from someone supplying drugs to the
prison. While Appleman and Chacon were attempting to contact suppliers, defendant
appeared unbidden with drugs to sell. Defendant implies that the DOC agents should
at that point have refused to buy drugsfromhim. However, the agents were not required
to ignore defendant's criminal conduct. Cf State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (1981) ("an
officer is not expected to ignore what is exposed to observation from a position where
he is lawfully entitled to be").
In sum, the agents acted within their statutory authority in arresting defendant when
he showed up on the scene and offered to commit a felony.

28

C.

Assuming arguendo the corrections officers acted outside the scope
of their statutory authority, defendant is not entitled to the remedy
of suppression.

Fourth Amendment Defendant claims that M[s]ince the warrantless, unlawful
arrest served as the basis for justifying the warrantless search, the exclusionary rule is
appropriate as a remedy." Br. Aplt. at 39. Defendant asserts "this issue on appeal as
a Fourth Amendment violation, and he specifically is challenging the validity of the arrest
as the basis for the search." Id. He seeks a per se rule excluding the fruits of a search
incident to an arrest unlawful under any state law. See Br. Aplt. at 40.
Defendant's argument fails on the law. It is true enough that, in order to support
a search under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest must be lawful: "It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search . .." United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218,235(1973).
However, the lawfulness of the arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes is measured,
not against state law, but against federal constitutional standards: "[t]he fact that the arrest,
search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards
developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended." United States v. Le, 1999
WL 176192, *4 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994)). See also United States v. Miller, 452
F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1971) ("we are not concerned with the validity of the arrests
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[by city police officers] and seizures measured by Oklahoma law, but rather . . . by federal
standards").
Other jurisdictions concur in this view. See, e.g., Abbott v. City of Crocker, Missouri,
30 F.3d 994, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court erred as a matter of law
in ruling "that the arrest in violation of state law necessarily also constituted a violation
of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Gilbert, 942 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir.
1991) (although the "search may not have complied with certain conditions required by
the state, it did not offend any constitutional principles that support the suppression of
evidence"); People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 31 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (otherwise
reasonable search incident to extraterritorial—and therefore statutorily unauthorized—arrest
did not violate constitution); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that the fact that evidence was obtained in search incident to
arrest under warrant issued in violation of state statute "does not by itself require
suppression"); State v. John, 639 A.2d 1062, 1064 (Me. 1994) (Fourth Amendment does
not require per se exclusion of evidence obtained in search incident to arrest based on
probable cause but unauthorized under state statute); City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416
N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ohio 1980) ("the fruits of the [extraterritorial] arrest of the defendant,
based on probable cause but unauthorized under existing state law, are not suppressive"
under Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Saul, 499 A.2d 358, 361 (Pa. Super. 1985)
(suppression of evidence seized by officer conducting drug sting outside geographical
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scope of his authority, in violation of state statute, would be "remedy all out of proportion");
cf Commonwealth v. Kiner, 697 A.2d 262, 269 (Pa. 1997) (evidence obtained in search
incident to arrest effected by trooper out of uniform must be suppressed).
United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995) illustrates this rule on facts analogous
to those at bar. City police officers stopped Bell, a gang member, while he was riding
a bicycle after midnight near a bar known to be the source of drug deliveries. Id. at 503.
After brief questioning, the officers arrested Bell for operating a bicycle without a headlight
in violation of Iowa law. Id. A search incident to arrest yielded 14.8 grams of cocaine
base. Id. The district court suppressed the cocaine on the ground that, under Iowa law,
the officers were authorized to issue Bell a citation, but not to arrest him and, consequently,
that the cocaine could not be validly seized incident to Bell's arrest. Id.
The Eighth Circuit reversed: "we do not think Fourth Amendment analysis requires
reference to an arrest's legality under state law. An arrest by state officers is reasonable
in the Fourth Amendment sense if it is based on probable cause." Id. at 504 (citations
omitted).
This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's language in Robinson: "A custodial
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. This sentence "seems to say that 'lawful'
refers not to the limitations of state law but rather to an overarching principle that all
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it takes to make a custodial arrest reasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense is that it
be based on probable cause." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES 1.5(b) (1996).
Defendant does not claim that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him or
that the arrest and search were unreasonable in any sense except that "at the time that
correctional officers diverted from their intended operation, they were acting outside
the scope of their authority under Utah law." See Br. Aplt. at 35. Therefore, the arrest
and the search incident to it did not violate the Fourth Amendment as defendant contends.
State law. Defendant also claims that State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987)
required suppression of the evidence derived from the search. See Br. Aplt. at 40-41.
Utah cases uniformly hold that mere violation of a rule of criminal procedure does
not require suppression. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992); State
v. Buck 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988); Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69; State v. Ribe,
876 P.2d 403, 410-11 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 617-18 (Utah
App. 1993).
Fixel involved a police officer who effected a controlled drug buy outside his
geographical jurisdiction. Id. at 1367. In so doing, he "clearly acted outside the scope
of his statutory authority" and committed a "violation of the law." Id. at 1368, 1369.
Fixel argued that this illegality required suppression, although he did not rely on federal
constitutional law. Id. at 1367-68.
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The Utah Supreme Court ruled that suppression "would be a remedy out of all
proportion to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual
liberties unimpaired." Id. at 1369 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421,
426 (Pa. 1985). The court stated that n[o]nly a 'fundamental' violation of [a rule of criminal
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' only where
it, in effect, renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment
standards." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Mason,
490 A.2d at 426). A non-fundamental violation requires suppression only where "(1)
there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not
have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional
and deliberate disregard of a provision of the [r]ule." Id. (quoting Mason, 490 A.2d at
426). Even then, "exclusion may be an appropriate remedy." Id. at 1369 (quoting Mason,
490 A.2d at 426).
Here, the alleged violation was not prejudicial. Courts generally ignore geographical
or other technical limits on an officer's jurisdiction in considering the propriety of exclusion.
See authorities cited above. Assuming arguendo that DOC agents acted outside their
statutory authority in arresting defendant, that technical violation "had nothing to do with
the extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Accordingly,
"the officers' conduct was not unreasonable, and the trial court did not err in refusing
to suppress the evidence seized." Id.
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Defendant points to no facts that would establish prejudice "in the sense that the
search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive," Pixel, 744 P.2d
at 1368, if local police had effected it. He asserts that no "local law agency . .. would
have approved the undercover operation," Br. Aplt. at 41, but this is mere speculation.
Nor has defendant demonstrated any "intentional or deliberate disregard" of the
statutes he cites. He relies solely on the fact that the agents knew that defendant was
not an original target of the operation. See Br. Aplt. at 44. Any inference of bad faith
is negated, however, by three facts: (1) as explained above, the statutes setting forth DOC
agents' authority did not clearly forbid the operation; (2) defendant thrust himself into
the drug sting; and (3) defendant knew he was selling to a prisoner out for a brief home
visit. See pp. 6-8, 24-25 herein.
In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate that either Fourth Amendment law
or state rules of criminal procedure require suppression of the drugs and money found
on his person. A fortiori, he cannot demonstrate plain error or ineffective assistance
of counsel here.
D.

The trial court did not commit plain error by not sua sponte
asserting this dubious claim.

Because defendant did not timely assert his challenge to the search, he must on
appeal demonstrate "plain error, meaning that error was obvious and substantially
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prejudicial." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 56 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. JDww, 850
P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993)).
"Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there
is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239
(Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). Defendant has not demonstrated, or even attempted
to demonstrate, any "settled appellate law" supporting his claim. Although he asserts
a Fourth Amendment violation, he cites no factually relevant Fourth Amendment law.
See Br. Aplt. at 32-34. He places primary reliance on Fixel State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d
427 (Utah 1992); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 1993); and Buck, see id
at 39-44, all non-constitutional decisions affirming the challenged convictions. Moreover,
as demonstrated above, the statutes governing the authority of DOC agents did not obviously
forbid the agents' actions in this case.
Defendant notes that in the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the court
asked a number of questions about why the DOC was involved in such an operation and
defendant's knowledge that the drugs might end up in prison. See Br. Aplt. at 46-47.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the hearing the court stated to the prosecutor: "Can
you hold those officers out there, and can I speak to you generally in my office about
the Department of Corrections and the manner in which they go about these things?"
(R. 287). However, there is no record of the in-chambers discussion. Defendant speculates
that the conversation concerned the very point he now presses. See Br. Aplt at 47. Perhaps
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it did, in which case the court probably reviewed the relevant statutes and reached the
conclusion that they did not clearly prohibit DOC from conducting the operation.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that defendant had established obvious error, the
error was not "substantially prejudicial," Bakalov, 1999 UT at | 56, for reasons stated
in point II.C. above.
E.

Trial counsel was not ineffective for not asserting this dubious claim.

Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised
does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Codianna, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah
1983) (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)). Nor does an attorney
perform outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance by not objecting
to evidence that is "arguably admissible." Chatham v. State, 889 S.W.2d 345, 352-53
(Tex. App. 1994). Moreover, "if an error was not obvious to the trial court, it most likely
was not obvious to trial counsel." State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App. 1997),
cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "It follows that the failure of counsel to object
to an alleged error that is not readily apparent cannot constitute an objectively deficient
performance." Id. (quoting State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert
granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995)).10

10

Thus, defendant's assertion that counsel's non-objection forced him "to argue plain error
on appeal," Br. Aplt. at 48, though true enough, leads nowhere.
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For reasons stated in points ILB., C, and D. above, any possible error here was
not obvious. Therefore, especially in view of the "strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," Taylor, 947
P.2d at 685, defendant has failed to establish his counsel's deficient performance as "a
demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877.
Likewise, plain error and ineffective assistance claims share "a common standard"
of prejudice. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989)). For reasons stated in point II.C. herein,
any deficient performance here was not prejudicial.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WILLFULLY
VIOLATED THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION IS NOT
AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking defendant's
probation, since "the facts fail to support the trial court's findings that [defendant] willfully
violated probation." Br. Aplt. at 24 (capitalization, underscoring, and boldface omitted).
Mootness. Apparently, defendant has since been released on parole (see addendum
D).u Substantial authority suggests that this release does not moot his challenge to his
parole revocation because lingering "collateral legal consequences" of the revocation

1{

The attached document, which indicates defendant's release on parole, is not part of the
record on appeal and is attached for the information of the Court only.
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persist. United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 101 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Larsen v.
Jorgensen, 862 P.2d 1382, 1383-84 (Utah App. 1993) (challenge to parole date not mooted
by inmate's subsequent release on parole); but see Vandenberg v. Rodgers, 801 F.2d
377, 378 (10th Cir. 1986) (inmate's parole mooted his challenge to delay of parole date).
Such potential collateral consequences identified by courts include the record of the
revocation, which could adversely affect future parole and sentencing decisions, Reider,
103 F.3d at 100, and the fact that existing restraints onfreedom"would potentially terminate
earlier if [the defendant] had been paroled earlier." Larsen, 862 P.2d at 1383-84. The
State thus does not claim that defendant's challenge is moot.
Relief. However, even assuming defendant prevails on this claim, the relief available
to him is limited. He asserts that "[tjhis case should be reversed" on the ground that
"[t]he trial court abused its discretion in terminating [defendant's] probation." Br. Aplt.
at 32. The remedy, if any, to which defendant is entitled is vacation of the revocation
order. See, e.g., Reider, 103 F.3d at 103 (remanding with instructions to vacate the
revocation order and dismissing revocation petition with prejudice). Accordingly, only
the efficacy of the revocation order, not the underlying conviction, is at stake in this point.
Proceedings below. One condition of defendant's probation was that he "complete
the Odyssey House and Aftercare (R. 106). After AP&P filed a "Progress/Violation
Report" (R. 110), the trial court held a hearing on its order to show cause why defendant's
probation should not be revoked (R. 612).
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Defendant was admitted to Odyssey House on 2 June 1994 and involuntarily removed
from the program on 24 June 1994 (R. 613). Upon his admission, defendant was informed
of the rules all residents are required to comply with in order to remain in the program
(R. 614-15).
Problems arose with defendant (R 615). He had "difficulty with his impulse control"
and "got escalated on two or three occasions" (R. 615). The first occurred at an Odyssey
House activity in a park (R. 627). Defendant said that his ex-wife lived across the street
from the park, and he became "very emotional over it" (R. 627). Back at Odyssey House,
defendant continued to escalate, until clinician Albert Nieto decided to "run a group with
him and try to de-escalate the situation, and so that his peers could be aware of what
was going on with [defendant]" (R. 628). Defendant made comments about wanting
to hurt himself and indicated "that if he got out he was going to assault his ex-wife" (R.
616,628).
Odyssey House put him on suicide watch (R. 615, 628). However, it "is not a
psychiatric facility" and is "not set up 24 hours a day with doctors," so a 24-hour suicide
watch was "difficult to do" (R. 615). Nieto took defendant to the University of Utah
Medical Center emergency room because of his ideation "about hurting himself, running
in[to] the street, letting someone run over him" (R. 616). He was seen by a physician
about his complaint of stomach ulcers and by a psychiatrist, then discharged (R. 629).
He returned to Odyssey House and "the ideation continued" (R. 630).
39

According to clinical director Tracy Anderson, Odyssey House has "basically four
cardinal rules," and "the issue around suicide acting out or ideation is very clear" (R.
613, 616). Anderson personally explained to defendant that if his behavior continued
"he would not be able to stay in the program" (R. 616-17). Defendant did, Anderson
testified, "have the ability to comply with the rules" of Odyssey House (R. 621).
The trial court found a violation of the conditions of probation, and that the "violation
was knowing and intentional under circumstances where the defendant had the ability
to comply with the Court's order on the conditions of probation" (R. 653). Accordingly,
the court revoked probation (R. 653).
Controlling principles. "Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing
in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-18-l(12)(aXH) (Supp. 1994). Although "fault is not necessary in every instance
of probation revocation,... as a general rule, in order to revoke probation for the violation
of a condition of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be
willful or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society." State v. Hodges,
798 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Utah App. 1990). If "the court finds that appellant's failure to
progress at an adequate rate resulted from problems beyond his control, his probation
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cannot be revoked unless it is also found that, because of this failure, appellant poses
a present danger to others." Id. at 277.12
In this context, the term "willful" does not equate "with the word intentional as
it is often used in other criminal contexts." State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah
App. 1991). Rather, afindingof willfulness "merely requires afindingthat the probationer
did not make bonafideefforts to meet the conditions of his probation." Id. at 84 (footnote
omitted).
In the trial court, the State bears the burden of establishing a probation violation
by a preponderance of the evidence. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 278. However, on appeal,
the burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that the court'sfindingis "against the clear
weight of the evidence" when that evidence is "viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court's findings." State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208, 208 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)
(emphasis omitted).
Analysis. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court'sfinding,the testimony
elicited below supports the trial court's finding. That finding was therefore not entered,
as defendant contends, in "the absence of any facts to support the determination that
[defendant] willfully violated Odyssey House rules." Br. Aplt. at 29.

12

Willfulness need not be shown if the probation agreement includes a condition that the
offender "make adequate progress in treatment, regardless of fault." Hodges, 798 P.2d at
278. The instant probation contained no such term.
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Tracy Anderson, clinical director of the Odyssey House Program, testified from
his observation that defendant did "have the ability to comply with the rules" of Odyssey
House (R. 613, 621). Defendant had no history of psychotic behavior, and his thinking
patterns were well within the range of a resident at Odyssey House (R. 622). Asked
if defendant "could be a patient in the Oddessy [sic] House program,... could satisfy
the regulations that you imposed," Anderson responded, "I think he was capable of doing
that" (R. 623).
As for defendant's suicide threats or gestures, defendant asserts that Anderson "stated
that he considered the suicide threat to be 'rear and that it was 'a serious affair.' (R.
616)." Br. Aplt. at 27. Here is what Anderson stated: "Like any other mental health
person, I have to take every suicide gesture and threat as real. So, yeah, it's a serious
affair" (R. 616). Anderson's meaning was clear: however skeptical he might have been,
he had to treat defendant's suicide threat as though it were real. Anderson added, "I
told [defendant] if he continued that behavior that he would not be able to stay at Oddessy
[sic] House" (R. 617). Obviously, this warning was inconsistent with a belief that defendant
had no control over his gesturing and consistent with a belief that defendant had the ability
to comply with the rules of the program.
No one testified that defendant was unable to comply with the rules of Odyssey
House. For example, no one testified that defendant was unable to control his rage upon
viewing his ex-wife's house across the street from the park where the Odyssey House
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residents were picnicking {see R. 627). Nor did any witness opine that defendant's threat
to assault his ex-wife "if he got out" (R. 616) resulted from "problems beyond his control."
Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277. On the contrary, clinician Albert Nieto testified that defendant
"didn't want to hear what was being said to him" (R. 628).
The following testimony from Nieto, elicited by the trial court, is also relevant:
Q. Did you perceive any of Mr. Maestas's acting out as being
manipulative?
A. I would say that at first, I would say so, yes. As it continued,
I would have to say no.
Q. And is that because after he initially began it he then found himself
in such a frenzy? Would that be a fair statement?
A.

You're — regarding his escalation and his — yes. Yes.

(R. 632-33). Nieto here opines in effect that defendant's misconduct was originally
manipulative, but that this manipulative behavior worked defendant into such a frenzy
that his further misconduct was caused more by that frenzy than by any intent to
manipulate—hardly a description of a probationer making "bona fide efforts to meet the
conditions of his probation." Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 84 (footnote omitted).
From these and other facts presented at the hearing, a judge could reasonably infer
that defendant was not making bona fide efforts to comply with the requirements of the
Odyssey House program. According, the revocation of defendant's probation should
be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
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64-13-1

STATE INSTITUTIONS

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional
facility operated by the department.
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated by the department to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting.
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate violence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department.
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Corrections.
(7) "Inmate" means any person who is committed to the custody of the
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail
at the request of the department.
(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at
least one of the following:
(a) c >mmitted to the custody of the department;
(b) on probation; or
(c) on parole.
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they
attempt to leave the institution without authorization.
tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and
(5).
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added present Subsection (5) and redesignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsections (6) to (9).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — State prisoner's right to personally
appear at civil trial to which he is a party—
state court cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1063.
Validity, construction, application, and ef-

feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed.
706.

64-13-2. Creation of department.
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervision of the executive director of the department. The department is the state
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the
Department of Human Services.
History: C. 1963, 64-13-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 198, i 2; 1990, ch. 183, 5 47.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

64-13-'

64-13-3. Executive director,

64-13-1. Definitions.

History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989,
ch. 224, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6)
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec-

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON

(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in th<
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology.
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within th<
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Chapter 22, Title 67, State Office
Compensation.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsectioi
(3).

64-13-6. Purposes of department.
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include:
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and conflnemenl
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate;
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders;
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders;
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and intei
ests of victims, where reasonable; and
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute an
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "purposes'* for "purpose** and
"include'* for "includes the following" in the introductory language; inserted "of offenders" in
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the
criminal offender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive society" in
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re-

habitation" and "for offenders'* for "to assi
the criminal offender in functioning as a lai
abiding and productive member of society"
Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (<t
which read "individualized treatment of the (
fender; and"; redesignated former Subsecti<
(5) as present Subsection (4); made punctu
tion changes and added "and" to the end,
Subsection (4); and added present Subsecti*
(5).

64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department.
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, f
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in tl
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders
facilities or programs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987, ch. 116, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment substituted "correctional" for "prison"
the first sentence.

ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted
"Human Services" for "Social Services'* at the
end of the second sentence.
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64-13-7.5

STATE INSTITUTIONS

64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services —
Contracts.
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental
health care providers.
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health services for persons in its custody.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 245, * 5; 1991, ch. 193, $ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, Tective April 29, 1991, added the Subsection (1) designation and added Subsection
(2); substituted "Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department determines
that a person in its custody is" for 'Tor persons
in the custody of the department who the de-

partment has determined to be" and made a
stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsection (1); and inserted "or other public or private mental health care providers" and made
related changes in the second sentence in Subsection (1).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 245, § 8
makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Right of state prison authorities to
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs

to prisoner without his or her consent—state
cases, 75 A.L.R.4th 1124.

64-13-8, Designation of employee powers.
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited
to the responsibility to bear firearms.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-8, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted the former first sentence; and

substituted "its'* for "those'* and "considers'* for
"deems'' and inserted "authority and** in the
remaining sentence,

DEPARTMENT OF COKKEUT1UIN3 — a m i r , r i u o u n

w-«-Aw-xvr.«

64-13-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211,

§ 4, relating to department services to other
agencies, effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-10. Department duties.
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers,
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its
purposes.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend*
ment substituted "correctional" for "prison"

and "necessary and as required to accomplish
its purposes" for "required for the safe management of public offenders/*

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Constitutional right of prisoners
to abortion services and facilities — federal
cases, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 683.

64-13-10.5. Education of persons in custody of Department
of Corrections — Contracting for services —
Transfer of supplies, equipment, furniture, and
budget — Joint committee.
(1) The State Board of Education is responsible for the education of persons
in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
(2) In order to fulfill this responsibility, the board shall, where feasible,
contract with appropriate private or public agencies to provide educational
and related administrative services.
(3) All supplies, equipment, office furniture, and budget which were, before
the effective date of this act, under the Department of Corrections, but, because of this act, will now come under the jurisdiction of the State Board oi
Education, shall be transferred to the board as of the effective date of this act
(4) A joint committee, including representatives of the board, the department, and each agency referred to in Subsection (2), shall make recommendations to that agency concerning the personnel to be transferred as part of th<
educational program. Those persons shall become employees of the agency ir
accordance with procedures established by the board and the agency.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
History: C. 1953, 64-13*10.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 157, § 2.
"Effective date of this act." — The term
"effective date of this act," in Subsection (3),
means the effective date of Laws 1987, Chapter
157, which is April 27, 1987.
Meaning of "this a c t " — The term "this

A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for
negligent supervision of probationer, 44
A.L.R.4th 638.

14

a c t / near the middle of Subsection (3), mean
Laws 1987, Chapter 157, which amended foi
mer § 53-2-12.3 and enacted this section,
Cross-References. — Responsibility for ecj
ucation of persons under 21 in custody of Dc
partment of Human Services or in juvenile d«
tention facility, § 53A-1-403.
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CHAPTER la
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION
Section
77-la-l.
77-la-2.
77-U-3.
77-la-4.
77-la-5.

Peace officer.
Correctional officer
Reserve and auxiliary officers.
Special function officer.
Federal officer.

77-la-l,

Section
77-la-6

Basic training requirements for position — Peace officers temporarily
in the state
77-la-7 Responsibility for training — Certi,fication
77-la-8. Retirement.
77-la-9. References in other provisions.

Peace officer.

(1) "Peace officer" means any employee of a police or law enforcement
agency which is part of or administered by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this
state or any of its political subdivisions.
(a) "Peace officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer, or marshal of any
county, city, or town;
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any swon* member of the
Department of Public Safety;
(iii) all persons specified in Section 23-20-1.5;
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university;
(v) investigators for the Department of Motor Vehicle Business
Administration;
(vi) special agents or investigators for the attorney general and
county attorneys;
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated as peace officers by law; and
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of
education for the school district.
(b) Any police force established by a private college or university shall,
prior to exercising its police power, apply to and be certified by the commissioner of public safety according to the rules of the Department of
Public Safety.
(2) Peace officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the authority
extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when they are acting under
Chapter 9, Title 77. This limitation does not apply to any peace officer employed by the state.
(3) (a) Peace officers shall, prior to exercising peace officer authority, satisfactorily complete the basic course at a certified peace officer training
academy or pass a certification examination as provided in Section
67-15-8, and be certified.
(b) In addition, peace officers shall satisfactorily complete annual certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the director of the
Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training, with the advice and
consent of the Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training.
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section designations in bUDsecuou \oi, aim substituted "certification" for "waiver" in Subsection (3Ka).
Cross-References. — Department of Public
Safety, Chapter 13 of Title 41
Natural Resources, Chapter 34 of Title 63
Peace officer training, Chapter 15 of Title 67

1985, ch^ 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 69, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote Subsection (l)(a) so as to create
Subsections (D(aMi) to (vni); substituted "and
be certified by the commissioner of public
safety according to" for "the commissioner of
public safety and be certified by the commis-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
authority, including an authorized undercover
investigation of a drug offense When an officer
does not comply with these statutory requirements, however, the information need not be
dismissed nor the evidence obtained as a result
of the illegal investigation be suppressed State
v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).

Authority.
—Undercover investigation.
Subsection (2) of this section and * 77-9-3
(territorial scope of authority) do not merely
apply to the officially exercised acts of a uniformed police officer, but are meant to encompass the total spectrum of an officer's acts and

77-la-2. Correctional officer.
(1) "Correctional officer" means an officer or employee of the Department of
Corrections or youth corrections or any political subdivision of the state which
is charged with the primary duty of providing community protection. Specific
assignments include controlling, transporting, supervising, and taking into
custody of persons arrested or convicted of crimes, supervising and preventing
the escape of persons in state and local incarceration facilities, providing
supervision of parolees and probationers, and providing investigative services
for offenders being considered for probation or parole.
(2) Correctional officers have peace officer authority only while engaged in
the performance of their duties. They do not have peace officer status while off
duty except when engaged in the activities in Subsection (2)(a). Correctional
officers may carry firearms only if authorized by and under conditions specified by the director of the Department of Corrections or the chief law enforcement officer of the employing agency.
(3) (a) No correctional officer or parole and probation agent may exercise
the authority of a peace officer until the officer has satisfactorily completed a basic training program for correctional officers and the director
of the Department of Corrections or the chief administrator of the employing agency has certified the completion of training to the director of Peace
Officer Standards and Training.
(b) The Department of Corrections of the state or the employing
agency, shall establish and maintain a corrections officer basic course and
in-service training programs as approved by the director of Peace Officer
Standards and Training, with the advice and consent of the Council on
Peace Officer Standards and Training. The training shall consist of no
fewer than 40 hours per year, and shall be conducted by the agency's own
staff or other agencies.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 174, § 3.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no Subsection (2)(a), as referred to in Subsection (2)

Cross-References. — Department of Corrections, Chapter 13 of Title 64.
Peace officer training, Chapter 15 of Title 67.
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uiru* XS\JUMU ur U1UMIXSAL PROCEDURE
Transcripts.
— Legibility.
Speedy trial.
— Delays by defendant
Delays caused by the defendant will not be
counted against the State and will weigh
against the defendant in considering whether,
under the circumstances, the trial was unnecessarily delayed. State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704
(Utah 1990).
—Federal custody.
Time a defendant spends in custody of federal authorities cannot be counted against the
state for speedy trial purposes. State v. Trafny,
799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990).
—Thirty-day requirement.
Subsection (l)(h) is directory in nature, not
mandatory. State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv. Rep.
16 (Ct. App. 1991).

Defendant, who failed to
pr«*mlW^
ment that he was actually prejudiiJiil^W
lay of 124 days between a n t * t ^ H i ? * ^4
not denied his»constitutional
riol!*!:
constitutionalright
fak^ ^ '
trial. State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv \Z~
App. 1991).
j fig!)
Transcript*,

^ f i ^ f

if

rCiAtb urnv^on uc-oiuMnnun

«-**•«» C 1953. 77-1-7, enacted by L.

T^j?7 tft2.

^ SSBJ^» Notes. — This section recodifies
^ ' ^ o c t i o n 77-35-25(d), which is Rule
''IrfjbelJtah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

For notes from cases construing that rule, see
the Court Rules volume.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12
makes the act effective on July 1, 1990.

•$*

CHAPTER l a
SPPEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION

—Legibility.
tti^ The condition of transcripts, in * i l ^ % i ' s .^jj£j 4 ..
t, :
lble)'
le)" appeared solely in conneetioit«kkV.A'^-.
•etWMrtMk'ifo.- ^ ^'j>

m

Special function officers.
the defendant of due process or of S7P' l *&4S S p e C , f u n c t l 0 f l °n,c<
AuthorFederal
appeal, because the transcripts w e S ^ ^ •$*
^ ^ °ffiCerS
complete and amply adequatefor• rtvi^^ ! ^$fc
^
the defendant's claims. State v. Jnnt>> fiflf ^-;'"'-%^ ^

902 (Utah ct App 1990).

^ ^ # C i l ^ 4 . Special function officers.

^0%:^Special
function officers" means persons performing specialized inves^ $ ^ ^Safionfl, service oflegal process, or security functions. These officers include
*$$:$$' »SJmilitary police, constables, port of entry officers, school district security
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
»:U*$$W
'
' I fioOT, Utah State Hospital security officers designated pursuant to Section
3' &&£203, Utah State Training School security officers designated p u r s u a n t
A.L.R. — Crimes against spouse within exStanding of media representative* flfffrp^
ception permitting testimony by one spouse zations to seek review of, or to inWrvtar^ • gSabsection 62A-5-206O), fire arson investigators for any political subdiviagainst other in criminal prosecution—modern oppose, order closing criminal prooMtbof& Ji fafofthe state, airport security officers of any airport owned or operated by
state cases, 74 A.L.R.4th 223.
j|tate ior any of its political subdivisions, railroad special agents deputized
public, 74 A.L.R.4th 476.
VH t * > imitate
Competency of one spouse to testify against
Adverse presumption or inference ^ & i # &,14?unl
m n t y„ sheriff under Section 17-30-2, and all other persons designated by
other in prosecution for offense against third
i&ftte
as having peace officer authority.
failure
to
produce
or
examine
codeftttfefri
v
party as affected by fact that offenae against
(a) Special function officers have peace officer authority only while enspouse was involved in same transaction, 74 accomplice who m not on trial — motUrt ttl^*
nal cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 812.
. i w ^^^JV| §gaged in the duties of their respective employment, and not for the purA.L.R.4th 277.
^ ^ > > ? | 3|po8e of general law enforcement. If the officer is charged with security
Jl; i>|i^functions respecting facilities or property, the powers may be exercised
!',*>*?«
r%z~—~z i
'xi
A. • i
~. .
. . . '»^*--:>/i31'cifRiunctions respecting lawnuca ui piupcitj, w*^ [ / w " w uwhere the officer is
77-1 7
• Dismissal Without trial — Custody or discharge f # &
<
i n c o n n e c t i o n with acts occurring on the property employer's
interest,
defendant.
^ ; | ^ ^employed or when required for the protection of the e
(1) (a) Further prosecutionforan offense is not barred if the court
^ vft'%-W
^ ¥ ^ ^ ^ Airport
^ l Zsecurity
^ ^ officers
^
have total peace officer authority when on
:'
an information or indictment based on the ground:
' *™
S.«&
^duty
and
when
acting
in
relation to the responsibilities of the airport a t
;*>«**
(i) there was unreasonable delay;
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction;
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the informatkii L
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings;*1^| ^
^ ^ ^ . ^
ing to the grand jury.
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the d ^ } ^ « ? ^ ^

®&:

rf

£ r e a r m s £y

constables

is authorized only while they

O t ^ i ^ / f ° ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' t ^ ' P ^ ^
"*> satisfactorily completed an approved basic
m ^ ^
n ^
Otherwise,
« provided
nrnvidedunder
under SubsecSubsecerw.se, the
tne defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated;>•$
e x m e r t ^1;™*?.
^ l ^ ^ r ™l
^ —_—" _^ ! ^ ^:„,f A
ffi c e r s as
u n,c.t ^i o^n 0 ^AW™
(2) Ani order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in b r i i i g i i < ^ ? » 2 ! S ^ 5 r ^ ^ ^ S i :
enforcement
officer
or
administrator
has
l
w
defendant
j % certified U**o »«wv w w.
prosecution for the offense charged,
'$. ^ and Training. City and county constables and their deputies shall certity
^ : t h e i r completion of training to the legislative governing body of the
| f county they serve.
,
-3* (b) The agency t h a t the special function officer serves shall establish
$ and maintain a basic special function course and in-service training proI grams as approved by the director of the Division of Peace Officer b t a n 93
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1-12-9. Allocation and distribution of funds.
The commission, in accordance with its policy, shall allocate $6,500,000 for
e construction of a fine arts center located at Salt Lake City, Utah and shall
stribute $1,500,000 outside Salt Lake City, in its discretion and under such
nditions as it prescribes to groups and local governments within the state to
sist them with their plans and development for commemoration of the 200th
rthday of the United States. The interest income may be used on projects
proved by the Commission both within and outside Salt Lake County. Fiincial participation by private, local or federal government sources or some
mbination thereof at a ratio determined by the commission shall be reired for all projects which receive state-appropriated funds.

Section
64-13-12.
64-13-13.
64-13-14.
64-13-15.
64-13-16
64-13-17.
64-13-18.
64-13-19.
64-13-20.
64-13-21.
64-13-22.
64-13-23.

64-13-1.

iistory: L. 1974, cfa. 40, § 2; 1975, ch. 192,

1-12-10. Contribution to construction and operation of
fine arts center.
The state of Utah shall have title to an undivided interest in the fine arts
iter proportionate to its contribution. The state of Utah shall contribute
,500,000 to the construction, operation and maintenance of the fine arts
iter and the commission may also use at its discretion the interest or any
rt of it, earned on the $6,500,000 for purposes of the construction, operation
d maintenance of the center. If the commission is unable to commit the
itching funds required by this act for construction of the fine arts center by
nuary 1, 1976, the $6,500,000 allocated herein for the fine arts center,
elusive of the interest theron, shall not be committed until further act of the
gislature excepting $500,000 which shall be allocated by the Bicentennial
mmission for the Bicentennial Ogden Union Station project.

Section
64-13-24.
64-13-25.
64-13-26.
64-13-27.
64-13-28.
64-13-29.
64-13-30.
64-13-31.
64-13-32.
64-13-33.
64-13-34.
64-13-35.

Jail facilities and cost*.
Deputy directors.
Prison facilities.
Inmate property.
Inmate employment.
Visitors to prison facilities.
Sentence of incarceration.
Prison labor.
Investigative services.
Community protection.
Community-based programs.
Compensation for inmate employment.

Standards for staff.
Standards for programs.
Private providers of services.
Records.
Hearings.
Violation of parole or probation.
Expenses of offenders.
Emergencies.
Discipline of offenders.
Restitution for offenses.
Safety of offenders
Alcohol and drugs.

Definitions-

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(2) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Corrections.
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 198, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 198, § 1 repeals former § 64-13-1, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 1, relating to
definitions of ,rboard," "division," and "director," and enacts the above section.
Cross-References. — Criminal identification, Chapter 26 of Title 77
Delivery of prisoners to prison, sheriffs duties, §§ 17-22-3, 64-13-24.
Establishment and support of institution,
Utah Const., Art. XIX, Sec. 2.

Land grants, Enabling Act, Sec. 12; Utah
Const., Art. XX, Sec. 1.
Location of institution, Utah Const., Art.
XIX, Sec. 3.
Offenses punishable by confinement in state
prison, § 76-3-208.
Place of execution of death penalty,
§ 77-19-10.
State prison commissioners, Utah Const.,
Art. VTI, Sec. 13.
Western Interstate Corrections Compact,
Chapter 28 of Title 77.

Iistory: L. 1974, ch. 40, 9 3; 1975, ch. 192,
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CHAPTER 13
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS —
STATE PRISON
unset Act. — Section 63-55-7 provides that all divisions, councils, offices, section*, and other
ities of the Department of Corrections are repealed effective July 1, 1993.
Lion
L3-1. Definitions.
L3-2. Creation of department.
L3-3 Executive director.
[3-4. Repealed.
L3-4 1. Creation of Corrections Advisory
Council.
3-5. Council duties

Section
64-13-6.
64-13-7.
64-13-8
64-13-9.

Purpose of department.
Offenders in custody of department.
Department staff.
Department services to other agencies.
64-13-10. Department duties.
64-13-11. Evaluation programs.
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Validity of classification procedures.
Procedures for classification and reclassification of inmates within the minimum, medium,
and maximum security areas of the state
prison, adopted by the Board of Corrections

pursuant to former § 64-9-25, were not arbitrary and did not depnve inmates of due process rights. Lavine v. Wright, 423 F. Supp. 357
(D. Utah 1976).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and
Correctional Institutions §§ 1 to 3.

C.J.S. — 72 CJS. Prisons § 2.
Key Numbers, — Prisons •» i.

64-13-2. Creation of department.
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervision of the executive director of the department. The department is the state
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the
Department of Social Services.
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1) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any
irmation necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its rensibilities under this chapter.
istory: C. 1963, 64-13-5, enacted by L.
>, ch. 198, I 5.
epeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as

enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating
division of corrections, and enacts the above
section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
J . S . — 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 5.
ey Numbers. — Prisons *» 4.

•13-6. Purpose of department.
Tie primary purpose of the Department of Corrections includes the follow(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement,
and supervision in the community where appropriate;
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of the criminal offender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive society;
(3) provision of rehabilitation opportunities to assist the criminal offender m functioning as a law-abiding and productive member of society;
(4) individualized treatment of the offender; and
(5) management of programs to take into account the needs and interests of victims where reasonable.
[istory: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L.
5, ch. 211, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
198, § 9 repeals § 64-13-6, and Laws 1985,

ch. 211, § 1 repeals former § 64-13-6 as
amended by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 16, relating
to appointment of director, and enacts the
above Hectwn.

-13-7. Offenders in custody of department.
\1I offenders committed for incarceration in a state prison facility, for survision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the
-tody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is
jponsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to
ilities or programs.
listory: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L.
15, ch. 211, § 2.
lepeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
211, § 2 repeals former § 64-13-7, as
icted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 7, relating to

administration of state prison, and enacts the
above section.
Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles,
Chapter 27 of Title 77.

64-13-8. Department stan.
The department shall employ staff necessary to operate prison facilities,
probation programs, parole programs, and other facilities and programs as
necessary for the management of the offender. The department shall designate by policy which of those employees have the powers of peace officers, the
power to administer oaths, and other powers the department deems appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility to bear firearms.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-8, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 3.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 3 repeals former § 64-13-8, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 8, relating to

appointment of warden, and enacts the above
section.
Cross-References. — Constitutional oath,
Utah Const., Art. IV, Sec. 10.
Official oaths and bonds, § 52-1-1 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 19.
Key Numbers. — Prisons «=» 13.

64-13-9. Department services to other agencies.
Within the various judicial districts, the department shall, as provided by
lav , provide investigation services to assist the court in sentencing decisions,
to assist the Board of Pardons in release decisions, and to assist in the internal
management of the department.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-9, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 4.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-9, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 9, relating to

warden's quarters, and enacts the above section.
Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles,
Chapter 27 of Title 77.

64-13-10. Department duties.
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, prison facilities, community correctional centers, and
other programs or facilities as required for the safe management of public
offenders.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 5.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-10, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 10, relating

to powers and duties of warden, and enacts the
above section.
Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles,
Chapter 27 of Title 77.

64-13-11. Evaluation programs.
The department shall operate evaluation programs necessary to serve public offenders committed to it for short-term evaluation by the district courts.
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iat was needed for state institutions, was not
:ontract for sale of goods, but rather was conjet for prison labor, and hence was void unr former statute. Price v Mabey, 62 Utah
6, 218 P. 724 (1923).

spect to establishment of a garment factory
within walls of prison, held, not to contravene
former statute. Pollock v. Mabey, 63 Utah 377,
226 P 186 (1924).

itablishment of garment factory.
Resolution of board of corrections with reCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and
rrectional Institutions §§ 34 to 40
C.J.S. — 18 C J.S. Convicts §§ 13 to 26; 72
J.S. Prisons § 18.

Key Numbers. — Convicts •» 7-10, 13;
Prisons *» 13.

H3-20. Investigative services.
The department shall provide investigative functions and prepare reports to
sist the courts in sentencing functions, and the Board of Pardons in its
cision-making responsibilities regarding offenders, the department in maning the offender, and to assure the professional and accountable managesnt of the department.
(1) The department shall establish standards for the provision of investigative services based on available resources, giving priority to felony
cases.
(2) The department shall employ staff for the purpose of thoroughly
investigating the social, physical, and mental conditions and background
of offenders and shall conduct examinations when required by the court
or Board of Pardons, subject to the limitations of Subsection 64-13-15(1).
The department may also provide recommendations concerning appropriate measures to be taken on behalf of offenders. If the court desires additional information it may commit the offender to the custody of the department for further evaluation as provided in § 76-3-404.
(3) The investigative reports prepared by the department are confidential and are not available for public inspection except upon court order, or
as provided in Subsection (4).
(4) Presentence reports shall be made available, upon request, to the
defendant, his attorney, the state's attorney, and other correctional programs within the state if the offender who is the subject of the report has
been committed or is being evaluated for commitment to the facility for
treatment as a condition of probation or parole. The presentence reports
shall include a victim impact statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases where the defendant caused bodily harm or death to the
victim. Victim impact statements shall:
(a) identify the victim of the offense;
(b) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(c) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by
the victim as a result of the offense, along with the seriousness and
permanence;
(d) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(e) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
118

(f) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. If
the victim is deceased, under a mental, physical, or legal disability,
or otherwise unable to provide the information required under this
section, the information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or family members, as necessary.
(5) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of corrections programs.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 15.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211 § 15 repeals fonner § 64-13-20 as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 20, relating
to visitors to prison, and enacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Access to state
records, §§ 63-2-66, 63-2-67.
Pardon and parole, Chapter 27 of Title 77.
Restitution to crime victim, §§ 76-3-201 to
76.3.201 2

64-13-21. Community protection.
For the purpose of maintaining community protection from offenders placed
on probation or conditionally released on parole, the department, except as
otherwise provided by law, shall supervise offenders in the community, including coordination of programs where appropriate, and restitution where
possible, and the provision of public service restitution work opportunities.
Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the department, giving priority to felony offenders based on available resources.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 16.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 211, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-21, as
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 21, relating

to reports by warden, and enacts the above section.
Cross-References. — Restitution to crime
victim, §§ 76-3-201 to 76-3-201.2.

64-13-22. Community-based programs.
(1) The department shall provide residential and nonresidential community-based programs, care, treatment, and supervision of offenders. The department shall place offenders committed to it for nonsecure supervision and
treatment in the most appropriate program, based upon the department's
evaluation and the available resources.
(2) The department shall establish and maintain facilities known as community correctional centers for work and day release programs for offenders.
(3) The department may allow an offender to leave a minimum security
facility, a community corrections center, or a community-based program during reasonable hours, for the purpose of assisting the offender in reintegration
into the community as a law-abiding and productive member of society. The
purpose includes, but is not limited to, employment, treatment, education
programs, and maintenance of family ties.
(4) The department shall establish rules governing release status for offenders. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the
119

64-13-17

STATE INSTITUTIONS

History: C. 1053, 64-13-16, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, &U; 1987, ch. 116, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "the department may employ
inmates to the degree that funding and available resources allow" for "inmates shall be era-

ployed on a regular basis, aa is practicable" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An
offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted
the former third, fourth, and last sentences,

64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence.
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advisory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legislature; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the
department or court order.
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with
any inmate without the consent of the department.
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or
other disturbance.
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility,
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Offenders and all visitors may be required to submit to a search or inspection of
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation.
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive correspondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is
subject to search, consistent with department rules.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON

64-13-20

plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods,
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department.
History: C. 1963, 64-13-19, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 211, § 14; 1987, ch. 116, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "correctional facilities" for

"the prisons'* at the end of the first sentence
and "offenders" for "inmates'* in the second and
third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the
third sentence.

64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investigations and diagnostic evaluations.

The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-

(1) The department shall:
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports
to:
(i) assist the courts in sentencing;
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities regarding offenders;
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the
department;
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic services based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases;
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting:
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders;
(ii) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons;
and
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under
Section 76-3-404.
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate
measures to be taken regarding offenders.
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports prepared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or
by rules made by the Department of Corrections.
(b) The reports are intended only for use by:
(i) the court in the sentencing process;
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities;
and
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender.
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state ii
the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of probation or parole.
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impad
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendani
caused bodily harm or death to the victim.
(b) Victim impact statements shall:

20
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History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, 3 12; 1987, ch. 116, 5 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided Subsection (1) into present Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb) and added present
Subsection UXc); in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "correctional" for "state pnson" near the
bepnmng of the subsection; m Subsection (2),
substituted A person may not for No person
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for

"inmate", and "under" for "those provided for
in" in the first sentence, substituted "Offenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising"
preceding "visitation" in the second sentence,
^ d deleted the former third sentence as set
o u t i n t h e bmuKi volume; and, in Subsection
( 3 ) substituted "Offenders housed at any cor^ ^
f a c l l i t y n for « I n m i l t e 8 » m th e
first
sentence

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison
regulation of inmates' possession of personal
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800.

64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities.

STATE INSTITUTIONS

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON

(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and
permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or
family members, as necessary.
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of
corrections programs.

tioners. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders.

64-13-21

History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, § 14; 1991,
ch. 206, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment redesignated Subsections (1) through (3)
as present Subsections (IXa) through UKc),
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (l)(d)
through (1X0, and Subsection (5) as present
Subsection (2), respectively; designated the former introductory language as ^ e introductory
anguage of present Subsection ( 1 ; substituted
investigative services for investigative functurns," -to assist" for "functions, and" preceding "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for
"the offender" and inserted "to assist" precedmg "the department" m the introductory Ianguage of Subsection (1); deleted "subject to the
hmitations of Subsection 64-13-15 (1)" from
the end of the first sentence of Subsection
(lXb); substituted "regarding" for "on behalf
of in the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b);
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection
(l)(b) as set out in the bound volume; rewrote

Subsection (lXc); deleted "the defendant, his
attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding
"other correctional programs'* in Subsection
(i)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(a) through
(4)(f) as present Subsections (l)(e)(i) through
(i)(e)(vi); substituted Hand" for "along with" in
Subsection (lXeXih)
T h e 1 9 9 1 a m e n d m e n t , effective April 29,
1 9 9 1 rewn)te S u D 8 e c t l o n { 1 ) ^ Subsections (1)
^
h 6) add
or ch
the subsectlon
Subsections (lXcXm) and
ae81^atlon8> add
,( 30>,,°
'
J*
.
.
,
MJ
)(b
; inserting references to diagnostic sera
in
"f
Subsections (IXa) and (1Kb), inserting
references to presentence diagnostic evaiua*™ and investigation reports in Subsections
<3>(a> a n d <4>» substituting the language begm™n& with "as defined" m Subsection (3Xa) for
"under Chapter 2, Title 63t regarding information practices," and making several stylistic
changes throughout Subsections (1) through
(6), and redesignated Subsection (2) as Subsection (7).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P 2d 1296
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in
community.
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sentenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on parole by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Proba22

History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, $ 16; 1987, ch. 116, & 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

64-13-23

ment rewrote the first sentence and made a
minor phraseology change in the second sentence.

64-13-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals
I 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211,

§ 17, relating to community-based programs,
effective April 27, 1987.

64-13-23. Offenders' income and finances.
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial
institution.
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum
balance in either or both accour*s for the particular offender's use upon
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of parole or probation.
(2) If placed in a joint account at a federally insured financial institution:
(a) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the financial institution to withdraw funds from the account.
(3) If placed in an account administered by the department, the department may by rule designate a certain portion of the offender's funds as
interest-bearing savings, and another portion as noninterest-bearing to
be used for day-to-day expenses.
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment; for courtordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments, or similar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for
any other debt to the state.
(5) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 116, § 16; 1991, ch. 125, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987,
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 18, relating to
compensation for inmate employment, and
enacts the present action
^ e n d m e n t Notes, - - T h e 199]I amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted while
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in the custody of the department or while on
probation or parole" and substituted "funds received or earned by him from any source" for
f,
hi 8 income from employment while in the cust ^ y 0 f the department or while on probation or
parole" in the introductory paragraph and de, e t e d « i n lta diacretion" after "department
„ i n S u b 8 e c t l o n (5).

64-13-17

STATE INSTITUTIONS

History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, ft 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "the department may employ
inmates to the degree that funding and available resources allow" for "inmates shall be em-

ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An
offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted
the former third, fourth, and last sentences

|
3
J
J
\
*
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64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspondence.
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advisory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legislature; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the
department or court order.
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with
any inmate without the consent of the department.
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or
other disturbance.
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility,
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Offenders and all visitors may be required to submit to a search or inspection of
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation.
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive correspondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is
subject to search, consistent with department rules.
History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 211, 5 12; 1987, ch. 116, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment divided Subsection (1) into present Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb) and added present
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "correctional" for "state prison" near the
beginmng of the subsection; in Subsection (2),
substituted A person may not for No person
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for

"inmate", and "under" for "those provided for
in" in the first sentence, substituted "Offenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising"
preceding "visitation" in the second sentence,
a n d deleted the former third sentence as set
fo^ volume; and, in Subsection
out m the
( 3 ) s u b 8 tituted "Offenders housed at any cor^ ^
f a c l h t y » f o r « I n m a t e 8 » m the first
gentence

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison
regulation of inmates' possession of personal
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800.

64-13*19. Labor at correctional facilities.
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup20
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON

64-13-20

*;i plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods,
{^materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department.
J.^k History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L.
l£985, ch. 211, ft 14; 1987, ch. 116, ft 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend( ment substituted "correctional facilities" for
:

"the prisons" at the end of the first sentence
and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and
third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the
third sentence.

;64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investiga*..
tions and diagnostic evaluations.

/ v ( l ) The department shall:
' tt>
( a ) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports

Xv to:

i,j
(i) assist the courts in sentencing;
*
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilirnc
ties regarding offenders;
|SQ
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and
j!,
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the
* >
department;
' *,*''
(b) establish standai i s for providing investigative and diagnostic ser\V* vices based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases;
'^'
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting:
, n.
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and
iu
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders;
(ii) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons;
and
J* ilX'
'
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds
j,',
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under
.., "
Section 76-3-404.
. l< (2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate
v measures to be taken regarding offenders.
' * (3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports pre%
pared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1
1(
.*.-, and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or
ji by rules made by the Department of Corrections.
*
(b) The reports are intended only for use by:
°
(i) the court in the sentencing process;
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities;
and
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treati
ment of the offender.
i3
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be
r made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if
t the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being
^evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of proba1
tion or parole.
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact
<„ statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant
v caused bodily harm or death to the victim,
(b) Victim impact statements shall:

1'
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REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409
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PILED DISTRICT COURT
THitr! •
h

j:

- i a ! District

Attorney for Defendant
»"
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
1QQ7
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
NOV 1 3 ' " '
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
SALT uu£|ggp*J^
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
^
Ir^-^S^S^,
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 921901600FS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

TONY MAESTAS,
Defendant.

On October 17,1997, an Evidentiary Hearing was held in the above-entitled
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. Pro. for the purpose of entering Findings of
Fact relevant to Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both parties were
present. Pursuant to Rule 23B(e), Utah R. App Pro. and based upon the evidence
presented by Appellant, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant, Tony Maestas, was represented at trial by

Mr. Victor Gordon.
2.

The Court has reviewed records contained in Tony Waldron's prison

file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections.

000784

3.

Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the

Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec.
(1993).
4.

The Court has reviewed records maintained by the Investigations

Bureau of the Utah Department of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of
Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant.
5.

Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the

Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec.
(1993).
6.

The aforementioned records contain the following information:

7.

Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November

5, 1990, on a conviction of two counts of Forgery, second degree felonies.
8.

Waldron's expected release date from prison was January 14,1993.

9.

As late as February 7, 1992, Waldron's expected release date

remained unchanged.
10.

On August 15, 1991, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison

11.

On November 26, 1991, Waldron was one of three inmates

dairy.

suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy into D block.
12.

On February 21,1992, Waldron was found to have injection sites on

his arm. Waldron admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy.
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13.

Waldron was recruited by Leo Lucy, an investigator with the

Department of Corrections to work as a confidential informant.
14.

On March 14, 1992, Waldron was moved from D-block on a

temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation".
15.

On March 14, 1992, Waldron was released on a home visit where

he agreed to purchase drugs to be smuggled into the prison as part of an undercover
operation for the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections.
16.

On March 14,1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling

cocaine to Tony Waldron.
17.

On April 2,1992, a Special Attention Hearing was held by the Board

of Pardons. A Special Attention Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under
special circumstances where a change of status may be warranted.
18.

Waldron was paroled that day. He was serving time for ten counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree felony, and an
additional count of Forgery, a third degree felony.
19.

Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled

substance or drug paraphernalia.
20.

Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled

Substance or Drug Paraphernalia.
21.

Waldron was never charged as a result of the Department of

Corrections' investigation that began November 26, 1991, of his involvement in
smuggling drugs into D-block.

3
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22.

Leo Lucy, the investigator with the Department of Corrections who

recruited Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron
received fo his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the
Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test.
23.

A review of Waldron's prison files also revealed the following

information relevant to his credibility:
a.

Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery,

a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony
Fleeing.
b.

Waldron was convicted on December 12,1990, of two counts

of Forgery, second degree felonies.
c.

On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State

Prison on one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven
counts of Forgery, second degree felonies, and one count of Forgery, a third degree
felony.
d.

Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections

in 1987 and had been described as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all".
e.

In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lon Brian with the

Davis County Metro Narcotics wanting to furnish information. Agent Brian requested use
of Waldron for an undercover investigation. AP&P determined that "it would not be wise
to allow him to participate" because of his history of drug dependency and attempted
escape. Waldron was told "there would be no special consideration".

4
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24.

Also relevant to Waldron's credibility was the following information

regarding his experience and skill at obtaining and hiding drugs on his person in the
prison:
a.

The investigation into Waldron and other inmates that began

in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the
anal cavity.
b.

On November 10,1989, Waldron was disciplined for a positive

urinalysis for marijuana and for hiding a white object in his mouth which he swallowed
before guards could retrieve it.
c.

On November 20, 1989, Waldron admitted hiding two

marijuana joints in his mouth while being searched, slipping them from his mouth into
a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat when the guard was not looking.
d.

On January 1,1988, Waldron was disciplined for Possession

of a Controlled Substance found hidden in his sock.
e.

On May 29,1988, Waldron was disciplined for possession of

a controlled substance.
f.

On June 7, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for a positive

urinalysis for marijuana.
g.

On March 30,1987, Waldron was disciplined for possession

of a controlled substance.

5
A A

n r? c c

25.

A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following

information suggesting that he had worked as confidential informant in the past:
a.

On July 15,1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber

County Jail because he had testified against other inmates.
b.

On November 5,1990, Waldron asked to be moved because

of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison.
c.

Waldron's Offender Reassessment forms indicate he had

safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1991.
26.

In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also

discovered that money booked into evidence with the alleged cocaine was likely stolen
by the custodian of the evidence.
DATED this /$

day of-Oatobcr, 1997.
BY THE COURT: ^ ^ l ' ; > / * \

JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE^
Third District Court, Division I

Approved as to form:

'RICHARD'S. SHEPHERD
Deputy District Attorney

REBECCAS. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant

6
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this 'Z^cJav of
October, 1997.
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STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT
TO: Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, Utah

REGARDING: MAESTES, Tony Robert

ATTN: Judge Michael R. Murphy

CASE NO.: 921901600

FROM: Field Operations/Region III

OFFENSES: Unlawful Distribution of
a Controlled Substance, a First
Degree Felony; Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Third
Degree Felony

DATE: June 23,1994

OBSCIS: 00072192

PROBATION DATE: December 20, 1993

ADDRESS: Odyssey House
Salt Lake City, Utah

DEFENSE ATTY: Victor Gordon

EMPLOYMENT: None

COMMENTS:
Your Honor, on June 23, 1994 at 10:00 a.m., this agent was notified
that the defendant, Tony Maestes, now residing at Odyssey House had
become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking staff and
personnel at Odyssey House. The defendant was rushed to the
University of Utah Medical Center for medical assistance. The
University of Utah staff indicated nothing could be done for the
defendant. Odyssey House personnel has requested the defendant be
removed immediately from the program. Due to the defendant's criminal
history this agency is requesting a No-Bail Bench Warrant be issued to
hold the defendant pending an Order to Show Cause Hearing.

conn

IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT:

NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT.

RECOMMENDATION: A NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT BE ISSUED AND AN ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE HEARING "BE CONDUCTED.
•

-" --• t-(,U.

•

RICHARD W.' SULLIVAN, SUPERVISOR

„

DOTOtf. WILSON

PROBATION OFFICElT'

APPROVED AND ORDERED : ^

^M-

DENIED:

DATE:
V^S
' f V
COMMENTS: ft kJ ~9?^ s&**jf
MAESTES/DW/de

0011

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BENCH WARRANT
STATE OF UTAH
VS.
DEFENDANT:
MAESTAS, TONY R
156 W MORRIS AVE
SLC

UT

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Case no:
921901600 FS
Circuit no:
C1853 921000471
Date of birth: 09/24/61
Dr license no: 0
UT
Social sec no:
- Vehicle lie no:
Orig Agen #:
3922464
OTN # :

TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
The above named defendant having been charged with the offense of
DIST C/S W/IN 1000' OF PROHIBITED PLACE - 1ST DEGREE
POSS OF A C/S - 3RD DEGREE
committed on March 14, 1992 has failed to comply with probation.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED forthwith to arrest and bring
the defendant before the Honorable Judge MICHAEL R MURPHY
or to deliver the defendant to the custody of the sheriff of
the above named county until further order of the court.
NO BAIL
ISSUED UNDER SEAL OF THIS COURT ON June 23, 1994.

This warrant may be served any time, day or night.
JUDGE MICHAEL R MURPHY

COPY

trUDGE / COURT CLERK

com

Addendum D

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
urArf s r u E
Consideration of the Status of MABSIAS, TONY R O M A X

OBSCIS AQ.

72192

PRISON HO.

23259

Iuj. above-enUtle 1 matter came 0:1 for consideration before th? Utaa Scace 3oard
of Parjoua on the 16tii day of September, 1997, foi*:

OHWIrfA', HfiAftliJS
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appetrin^, ltd Board
ia*:;es trie following decision ani order:
*BSULrS
Parole effective 09/01/1993. Final
decision of the rearing h.»ld on 09/04/1997.
i Pay $600,00 fine and aurciiirg* CASE* 92-io00.
I ouccesjf'iily complete Substance A'jase 'Jieripy.
J Successfully complete Cocunu/iity C3rrectloa-.l Center* (co
addres.3 oubstiit-e -uijust* issued).

Ho Crioc

T
2

Sent Case No«

AKiA^EIoiSIUiullOH
POSSESSION' OF A C/S

OF V L

921901600

0-5 921901500

Judge_
MURPHY
MJRPiiY

Expiration
LIFE
1)4/09/1999

Tuis decision i3 subject tu review and modification by t is 3o*ird of Pardons at
a ay tlua until actual relaa&e frona custody.
By order of the Board of Pardons of tne State of Utan, I nave this date
16th day of Septe^oer, 1*997, affiled ray signature as Ciairoan for and
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons*

